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WASffNGTON CASE LAW 19641965
Presented below is the twelfth annual survey of Washington Case
Law. The articles in this survey issue were written by second-year
students under the direction of the Recent Developments Editor of the
Law Review.
This case survey issue does not represent an attempt to discuss every
Washington case decided in 1964-65. Rather, its purpose is to point
out those cases which in the opinion of the Review constitute substantial additions to the body of law in Washington.
During the coming year the Law Review will continue to collect
Washington cases for publication in the 1965-66 survey issue. However, case notes on Washington decisions of national significance will be
published as they are completed.
BANKRUPTCY
Financial Statement Upon Prior Inof
False
Discharge-Effect
debtedness. In the 1961 case of Household Fin. Corp. v. DeShazo,'
the Washington Suprere Court held that section 17(a)(2) of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act' limited a creditor to recovery of the amount
of an additional loan made in reliance upon a false financial statement,
and did not permit recovery of prior indebtedness-not initially obtained by fraud-which was refinanced in the same transaction and
included in the total amount of a new note.
DeShazo was overruled by a recent decision involving almost identical facts. In the recent case, plaintiff finance company relied upon
defendants' false financial statement to increase defendants' existing
indebtedness, and exchanged defendants' old note for a new note in
the amount of $331.84. In an action on the new note, defendants
claimed discharge in bankruptcy. The trial court considered DeShazo
controlling and limited plaintiff's recovery to $94.89, the amount of the
new loan plus interest. On appeal, held: A debtor is not discharged by
section 17(a) (2) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act from liability for the
1 57 Wn2d 771, 359 P2d 1044 (1961). Theaction had been commenced June 18,1959.

2 74 Stat. 409 (1960), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (a) (2) (Supp. V, 1963) : "A discharge in
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable
in full or in part, except such as... (2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property
by false pretenses or false representations, or for obtainingmoney or property on credit
or obtaining an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a materiallyfalse statement in writing respecting his financial condition made or published or caused to be
(Emphasis
made or published in any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive.
added.) The italicized language was added by amendment in 1960.
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unpaid balance of prior indebtedness, not initially obtained by fraud,
which was refinanced in reliance upon his false financial statement.
Federal Fin. Co. v. Merkel, 65 Wash. Dec.2d 361, 397 P.2d 436
(1964).
The court in DeShazo had adopted a minority position,' finding that
the basic policy underlying the Bankruptcy Act was to minimize the
amount of enforcible debts after discharge in bankruptcy. When
DeShazo was decided, a creditor acting in reliance upon a false financial
statement had remedies under both sections 14(c) (3)1 and 17(a) (2).s
He could have prevented discharge in bankruptcy altogether under
section 14(c) (3), or he could have sought recovery after discharge
under section 17(a) (2). In 1960, section 14(c) (3) was amended to
provide that discharge in bankruptcy can only be prevented if the
bankrupt fraudulently obtained credit for specified business purposes.'
The court in the principal case found that Congress, in exchange for
the loss of power to prevent discharge in non-business cases, amended
section 17(a)(2) so as to give small loan companies the "right to
secure their whole indebtedness from a dishonest debtor.... "' Consequently, the court in the principal case held that the 1960 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act required reversal of DeSkazo.
5
The court in the principal case so recognized. 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 363, 397 P.2d at
437. In DeShazo the defendant was not in default on the existing note. Therefore, the
court in DeShazo reasoned that the only "money or property" obtained by false representations was the additional amount of the new loan, while the majority of state courts
held that an extension or renewal of existing indebtedness was also "property" within
section 17(a) (2). Characteristic of the majority view is Personal Fin. Co. v.
Bruns, 16 N.J. Super. 133, 84 A.2d 32 (1951). Characteristic of the minority view are
Household Fin. Corp. v. Christian, 8 Wis2d 53, 98 N.W2d 390 (1957); Personal
Finance Co. v. Murphy, 53 So2d 421 (1.a 1951). Cases are collected and discussed in
Brief for Appelant, Federal Fin. Co. v. Merkel, 65 Wash. Dec.2d 361, 397 P2d 436

(1964).

'Prior to amendment the section read as follows: "The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has ... (3) obtained money or property on
credit, or obtained an extension or renewal of credit, by making or publishing or causing to be made or published in any manner whatsoever, a materially false statement in
writing
respecting his financial condition....:Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 850 (1938).
5
Supra note 2.
6 74 Stat. 408 (1960), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (3)
(Supp. V, 1963): "The court shall
grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has ... (3) while engaged in
business as a sole proprietor, partnership, or as an executive of a corporation, obtained
for such business money or property on credit or as an extension or renewal of credit
by making or publishing or causing to be made or published in any manner whatsoever
a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition or the financial
condition of such partnership or corporation...
7 65 Wash.Dec2d at 367, 397 P2d at 439. The court also found congressional intent
to bring the minority into line with already existing case law, citing S. Ra. No. 1688,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2954 (1960) ; Hearing on H.R. 106 Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1958). See Comment,
Effect of False Financial Statements o) Debts Discharged in Bankruptcy--Section
17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 21 LA. L. Rav. 638 (1961).
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The decision in the principal case to overrule DeSkazo, although
based upon statutory amendment rather than reevaluation of the former
rule,' has brought Washington law into line with the majority position.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Federal Savings Bonds-P.O.D. Beneficiary Other Than Surviving Spouse. The United States Supreme Court recently handed down a
decision reversing the Washington Supreme Court which has important
ramifications in all community property jurisdictions. The problem
began when Angel N. Yiatchos purchased Series E United States
savings bonds with community funds. Angel became registered owner
of the bonds and his brother was designated P.O.D. (payable on death)
beneficiary.' After Angel's death, his widow refused to deliver the
bonds to the brother. The brother then brought suit against the widow
individually and as executrix to determine ownership of the bonds.
Angel's widow sought one-half interest in the bonds as her community
share and asked that the proceeds of the remaining bonds be distributed to the devisees named in decedent's will.2 On stipulated facts, the
Supreme Court of Washington held that Angel's purchase with community funds of bonds payable to him alone, or to his brother upon his
death, was in fraud of his wife's rights and was therefore void ab intio.'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Held: Because Treasury regulations have the force of federal law, the
P.O.D. beneficiary of federal savings bonds is entitled to the bonds
unless their purchase by a husband with community funds is a "fraud"
upon the wife as determined by federal law, and the wife has an undivided one-half interest in the bonds as a community asset. Yiatchos v.
Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
In the first Washington case involving the survivorship provisions of
the Treasury regulations, Decker v. Fowler," the court adopted the
8 "Since we are convinced that congressional intent is clear in this case, we cannot
substitute our judgment for the obvious policy decision that Congress has made here."
65 Wash.Dec.2d at 367, 397 P.2d at 439.

131 C.F.R. § 315.66 (1959) provides that upon the death of the registered owner, the
P.O.D. beneficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner of federal saving
bonds.
2 See WAsH. Ray. CODE § 11.04.050 (1963).
3
In re Yiatchos Estate, 60 Wn2d 179, 373 P2d 125 (1962). See Comment, 38
WASH. L. REv. 255 (1963).
4 199 Wash. 549, 92 P.2d 254 (1939). The court rejected claims of the P.O.D. beneficiary to federal savings bonds on a gift theory, holding that, absent a valid delivery of
the bonds, the designation of a P.O.D. beneficiary was ineffective as a gift. This rationale was severely criticized; see 14 WASH. L. Ray. 312 (1939). Legislation designed

